DISARMAMENT

Newsletter

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World Disarmament Campaign
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The cover photograph shows a 39-foot-high sculpture entitled "Good Defeats Evil" with St. George slaying a dragon made from fragments of dismantled Soviet SS-20 and US Pershing nuclear missiles. The statue, contributed by the Soviet Union, was created by Georgian artist Zurab Tsereteli.
(Photo credit: Alex Webster)

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Setting for part of the Paris meetings of November 1990 during which the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty was signed in the context of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. (Photo credit: French Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Historic force reduction agreement

Twenty-two heads of State or Government of the member States of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization meeting in Paris signed the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty on 19 November 1990. Seeking to establish a stable and secure balance of conventional forces at lower levels, to eliminate disparities in forces and the capability to launch a surprise attack and large-scale offensive operations, the Treaty has been hailed as the most ambitious arms and force limitation agreement ever concluded. In spite of its far-reaching nature and its technical complexity, it was negotiated in record time. It took 20 months to complete the Treaty, in contrast to the 15 years spent on the previous unsuccessful effort to agree on conventional force reductions.

The CFE Treaty puts equal ceilings and sub-ceilings for the two sides on tanks, armoured combat vehicles, artillery, combat aircraft and attack helicopters, requiring verified destruction of excess equipment during a three-year period (or, in a few cases, conversion for civilian purposes). It also sets up an elaborate system of verification, including data exchange, on-site inspection, challenge inspection and on-site monitoring of the destruction of military equipment to be reduced. The sub-ceilings set limits on the quantity of different kinds of military ground equipment permitted within major categories (for instance armoured personnel carriers, armoured infantry fighting vehicles), and on how much of it may be stationed in each of four sub-zones of the Atlantic to the Ural Area (ATTU). Another agreed sub-ceiling is referred to as the sufficiency rule and sets a limit on the proportion of the total permitted to each side that can be held by any single country (about one third).

During the negotiation period several of the premises under which participants entered the negotiations changed significantly, requiring considerable creativity and flexibility by negotiators. For instance, a series of bilateral agreements was signed between the USSR and other members of the WTO regarding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from their territories. On 3 October the two German States united, jointly stating in advance that at the time of signature of the CFE Treaty the united Germany would undertake to reduce its combined forces to 370,000 personnel (from 667,000). The CFE Treaty also commits its parties to follow-on negotiations with the same basic mandate in which they are expected to seek agreement on, among other things, manpower levels. They also agreed not to increase existing levels during the new round of negotiations.

While most of the often difficult questions concerning definitions were solved in agreed language within the Treaty, the question of land-based naval aircraft was solved by a commitment outside the Treaty to limit them to 430 on each side.

The negotiations between the 22 member States of the two military Alliances had taken place in Vienna within the framework of the 34-nation Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE). An additional set of Confidence- and Security-building Measures (CSBMs), complementing those agreed on in the Helsinki Act of 1975 and the Stockholm Document of 1986, was also agreed on in Vienna and adopted by the 34 participating States at the CSCE meeting in Paris, together with a "Charter of Paris for a New Europe".

CFE Reductions

Treaty limited items	1988 levels	CFE ceiling per side	In any one country
Tanks	*NATO* 22,000 *WTO* 60,000	20,000	13,300
Artillery	*NATO* 21,000 *WTO* 61,000	20,000	13,700
Armoured Combat Vehicles	*NATO* 27,000 *WTO* 63,000	30,000	20,000
Combat Aircraft	*NATO* 6,300 *WTO* 14,000	6,800	5,150
Attack Helicopters	*NATO* 2,000 *WTO* 3,000	2,000	1,500

READEX FICHE

Vienna Document of 1990

On 17 November 1990 representatives of the 34 States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) adopted the text of the Vienna Document of 1990 on confidence- and security-building measures.

The Document integrates a set of new CSBMs with measures adopted in the Document of the Stockholm Conference of 1986 in a way that further develops those provisions in the light of the experience gained.

The main text of the Vienna document deals with annual exchanges of information in an agreed format on the command organization and deployment of military forces and weapon systems, information on plans for future deployment and information on military budgets giving itemized defence expenditures on the basis of the categories set out in the United Nations "Instrument for standardized international reporting of military expenditures" of December 1988.

In a section on risk reduction, the Document of 1990 specifies mechanisms for consultation and co-operation as regards unusual military activities and regarding hazardous military incidents. It also delineates procedures for military contacts and visits to air bases, and extends the arrangements made earlier regarding prior notification of certain military activities and for verification of compliance, including inspection on request. It provides for a network of direct communications between the capitals of the participating States and for annual implementation assessment meetings.

CSCE and CFE Highlights

Helsinki, August 1975

35 CSCE States adopt Helsinki Final Act regarding:

- security, including a first set of CSBMs
- economic and scientific co-operation
- human rights concerns

Madrid, November 1980 - September 1983

Second CSCE Review Conference sets mandate for special conference on CSBMs and disarmament in Europe with the first stage to be held in Stockholm

Stockholm, January 1984 - September 1986

Conference agrees on further and more detailed CSBMs relating to CSCE States' military activities

Vienna, January 1989

Third CSCE Review Conference agrees on two sets of talks in Vienna: one on CSBMs with 35 (later 34) participants, and one on CFE with 23 (later 22) participants

Paris, November 1990

Heads of State and Government sign:

- CFE Treaty
- Vienna Document of 1990 on CSBMs
- Charter of Paris for a New Europe

The 34 States participating in CSCE and the 22 in CFE(*)

Austria
Belgium*
Bulgaria*
Canada*
Cyprus
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic*
Denmark*
Finland
France*
Germany*
Greece*
Holy See
Hungary*
Iceland*
Ireland
Italy*
Liechtenstein
Luxembourg*
Malta
Monaco
Netherlands*
Norway*
Poland*
Portugal*
Romania*
San Marino
Spain*
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey*
USSR*
United Kingdom*
United States*
Yugoslavia

Charter for a New Europe adopted in Paris

Heads of State and Government participating in the CSCE Summit in Paris in November 1990. (Photo credit: French Ministry of Foreign Affairs)

Meeting in Paris, the Heads of State or Government of the 34 States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) adopted a "Charter of Paris for a New Europe" on 21 November 1990. Stating that "Europe is liberating itself from the legacy of the past", the 34 signatories of the Charter pledged to strengthen democracy and recognize that human rights and fundamental freedoms are the birthright of all human beings which it is the first responsibility of government to protect and promote. They asserted that the free will of the individual, exercised in democracy and protected by the rule of law, forms the necessary basis for successful economic and social development.

In a section on the CSCE and the world, the parties fully supported "the United Nations and the enhancement of its role in promoting international peace, security and justice," and noted the growing role of the United Nations in world affairs.

Discussing guidelines for the future, the Charter stressed the human dimension including the free flow of information and ideas, and co-operation to strengthen democratic institutions. It expressed the determination of the parties to foster the contribution of national minorities and protect their cultural identity. Recognizing the contribution of the Council of Europe to the promotion of human rights and the principles of democracy and the rule of law, the Charter welcomed the move by several participating States to join the Council of Europe and to adhere to its European Convention on Human Rights.

Regarding security, the signatories undertook to build on the important achievements attained in the CFE Treaty, and also in the Negotiations on Confidence- and Security-building Measures which they undertook to conclude no later than the Follow-up Meeting of the CSCE to be held in Helsinki in 1992.

They also called for the earliest possible conclusion of the Convention on an effectively verifiable, global and comprehensive ban on chemical weapons, and expressed their intent to be original signatories.

They undertook to seek new forms of co-operation in the peaceful settlement of disputes as a complement to the duty of States to refrain from the threat or use of force.

The Charter also discussed economic co-operation, environment and the essential contribution of a common European culture and shared values in overcoming the division of the continent.

The Charter recalled the major role non-governmental organizations had played in achieving the goals of the CSCE, and the signatories undertook to "further facilitate the activities of NGOs for the implementation of the CSCE commitments by the participating States".

The signatories of the Charter stated that their common efforts to consolidate respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law and to strengthen peace and promote unity in Europe required a new quality of political dialogue and co-operation and the development of new structures of the CSCE. To this end they decided to have regular meetings of their Heads of State or Government starting with the 1992 Helsinki CSCE Follow-up Meeting.

The CSCE Ministers of Foreign Affairs, which are to meet as a Council regularly at least once a year to provide the central forum for political consultations within the CSCE process, will hold their first meeting in Berlin.

A CSCE Secretariat will be established in Prague to provide administrative support to the meetings of the Council and to a Committee of Senior Officials, to maintain an archive of CSCE documentation, to provide information to individuals, NGOs, international organizations and non-participating States and to provide support to the Executive Secretaries of CSCE summit meetings. The Secretariat will be responsible to the Council through the Committee of Senior Officials.

A Conflict Prevention Centre will be established in Vienna to assist the Council in reducing the risk of conflict especially by giving support to the implementation of confidence- and security-building measures. It will carry out the tasks assigned to it by a Consultative Committee composed of representatives from all participating States.

An Office for Free Elections will be established in Warsaw to facilitate contacts and the exchange of information on elections within participating States. It too will be responsible to the CSCE Council through the Committee of Senior Officials.

Test Ban Amendment Conference

Meeting from 7 to 18 January 1991, at United Nations headquarters in New York, 100 of the 117 States parties to the partial test-ban Treaty (PTBT) considered a proposal to extend the Treaty's ban on atmospheric, outer space and under water nuclear weapons tests to include underground tests.

Unable to reach consensus, the States parties to the 1963 Treaty concluded their two week Conference with a decision, taken by a vote of 74 to 2 with 19 abstentions. It mandated the President of the Conference to conduct consultations with a view to achieving progress on the issues and resuming the work of the Conference at an appropriate time.

In a closing statement, the President of the Conference, Foreign Minister Ali Alatas of Indonesia, said the end of nuclear testing for all time was a vital global objective that needed to be pursued at different levels, especially the multilateral level, so that a comprehensive test ban would be universally supported. He said there was a firm and continuing commitment to achieving such a ban and that he would try to fulfil the responsibility entrusted to him by the Conference in its decision.

Although the achievement of a comprehensive test ban (CTB) has been a broadly supported goal since the 1950's, the Amendment Conference has been a controversial issue. The United States and the United Kingdom, whose support is required for any amendments to be adopted, have opposed the proposal, but nevertheless abided by the Treaty obligation of the three original parties, which includes the Soviet Union, in convening the Conference.

At the opening session of the Amendment Conference of the partial test-ban Treaty Ambassador Edmond Jayasinge of Sri Lanka who was President of the Conference's Organizational Meeting turned over the gavel to Foreign Minister Ali Alatas of Indonesia who was President of the Conference. They are flanked by UN Secretary-General, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, and by the Secretary-General of the Conference, Sohrab Kheradi. (Photo credit: UN Photo 177194/Milton Grant)

Other parties to the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 which strongly support a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing at an early date think this should be negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament. In the vote at the end of the Amendment Conference, some of these countries nonetheless supported the decision that Foreign Minister Alatas continue consultations.

The leader of the United States delegation who had voted against the decision said the United States continued to be committed to a comprehensive test ban, but believed it could not be viewed independently from the need for reliance on a nuclear deterrent. When the Conference on Disarmament reopened in Geneva later in January, the United States looked forward to working there on issues related to achieving a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Amendment of the PTBT was formally proposed on 5 August 1988 — the 25th anniversary of the signing of the PTBT in Moscow — by Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Yugoslavia which had urged recourse to this procedure since 1985 in various UN General Assembly resolutions.

Under the PTBT's article II, a proposal for amendment can be made by any party to the Treaty. The three depositary States or original parties are then required to convene a conference to consider the amendment if so requested by at least one third of the parties. Actual amendment requires a simple majority of the parties including the three original parties.

The amendment proposed in 1988 is relatively simple: an additional article would be added, whereby protocols annexed to the Treaty would be integral to it. This would be followed by two new protocols, committing the parties to prohibit, to prevent, and not to carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion, or any other nuclear explosion, at any place under its jurisdiction and control underground or in any other environment. A second protocol would provide for the verification of the expanded Treaty.

A new focus of the statements in the Conference pointed to a broad concern regarding the adverse health effects resulting from underground testing. This was expressed especially by States parties close to testing sites.

NGOs address Amendment Conference

On 9 January, representatives of 33 of the 123 non-governmental organizations at the Conference addressed an informal session.

The speakers contributing specialized information included George Bunn of the Lawyers Alliance for World Security who recounted the legislative history of the negotiation of the 1963 Treaty saying that efforts had been made to ensure ease of amendment so that the Treaty could be extended to cover underground tests.

Betty Lall of the Council on Economic Priorities said there were no technical obstacles to a comprehensive ban on testing because seismologists have the means to detect nuclear tests and distinguish them from earthquakes down to a one-kiloton level and below.

Robert Schwartz of Economists Against the Arms Race said that nuclear tests had cost the United States some $700 million annually in recent years – an expenditure which he compared with the $200 million expenditure that he said would be needed to inoculate all the world's children born in one year against the six major fatal childhood diseases.

A number of the interventions were made from an ethical and moral perspective: the Presbyterian Church (USA) together with the World Alliance of Reformed Churches; the Unitarian Universalist Association together with the International Association for Religious Freedom. Nichiko Niwano of Rissho Kosei-kai, a lay Buddhist organization based in Japan, made a presentation, as did David Kasahara on behalf of the President of Soka Gakkai International, Daisaku Ikeda.

Homer Jack spoke on behalf of the World Conference on Religion and Peace, which is composed of some leaders of the major world religions living in more than 60 countries on all continents. Sister Mary Beth Reissen spoke as the representative of Pax Christi International. All the representatives of religious organizations spoke in favour of a comprehensive test-ban at an early date.

A large share of the presentations were by people who had personal experience of being in the immediate vacinity of various nuclear testing sites.

Janet Gordon, who spoke on behalf of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom described herself as a "Downwinder from the Nevada Test Site". She described the experience of her family and neighbours and the effects of radioactive fallout on the animals on her family ranch, and on her brother who died at age 26 of pancreatic cancer. She said these effects of atmospheric testing had not stopped when there was only underground testing. She referred to small emissions that she said accompany almost every test and to the serious accidents which had occurred in December 1970 and during 1986 in the United States, and at Semipalatinsk in the Soviet Union in 1989.

Olzuhs Suliemenov from Kazakhstan in the Soviet Union spoke as the founder of the Nevada-Semipalatinsk Movement and as a leader in the popular effort that had stopped Soviet testing at Semipalatinsk.

Rev. Remuna Tufatusariua, who was a Delegate of the Evangelical Church of Polynesia, said the nuclear tests in Mururoa and Famgataifa raised ecological and medical questions and had disturbed the cultural relationship between the people and the soil.

The Mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki spoke for the World Conference of Mayors for Peace from the unique perspective of their two cities. Two medical doctors from International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War and from its Canadian component spoke from their professional vantage point.

Major grass roots organizations that addressed the Conference included the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament in the UK and the United States Comprehensive Test Ban Coalition which consists of 75 national organizations and 30 local city coalitions. The Executive Director of the US Coalition, Carolyn Cottom, reported that opinion polls consistently show that 75-85% of the people in the United States support an end to nuclear-weapon testing.

Representatives of Greenpeace came to the Conference directly from the Nevada Test Site where they had joined with 4,000 people from 14 countries to try to reclaim that land for the Shoshone Indian people.

Parliamentarians for Global Action said that their members had decided to work for an amendment of the PTBT due to frustration over the lack of progress at the Conference on Disarmament and because the number of nuclear weapons in the world had increased rather than diminished since that Treaty and the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty had been concluded.

Part of the International Ribbons exhibit at the United Nations

New Publications

The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol. 11, 1986 (Spanish)
Sales No. S.87.IX.1

The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol. 13, 1988 (Spanish)
Sales No. S.89.IX.5

The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol. 13, 1988 (French)
Sales No. F.89.IX.5

Disarmament: A Periodic Review, Vol.XIV, No.1, 1991 (English)
Sales No. E.91.IX.2

Topical Papers 4: Naval Confidence-building Measures,
Sales No. E. 90.IX.10

Topical Papers 5:Conversion: Economic Adjustments in an Era of Arms Reductions (Volume 1)
Sales No. E. 91.IX.6

Disarmament Facts 72: The Role of the United Nations in the Field of Verification, Summary of a United Nations Study. Free of charge from the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs in all six official languages.

Programme of Training on Conflict Resolution, Crisis Prevention and Management and Confidence-building among African States: Workshop for Senior African Military and Civilian Officials (English)

Funding for World Disarmament Campaign drops

The 1990 Pledging Conference for the World Disarmament Campaign was held on 25 October at United Nations headquarters. Twenty governments pledged financial support for various disarmament-related activities of the United Nations.

In spite of many statements expressing appreciation and support for work of the Department for Disarmament Affairs, in particular for its information programme, the downward trend in funding for the World Disaramament Campaign continued. The total pledged to the World Disarmament Campaign fund for 1991 was US$106,673 in convertible currencies as distinct from a comparable sum of $180,584 for the previous year.

Additional contributions were pledged for an International Conference on Disarmament in Teheran, Iran ($2,000, plus 10,000,000 rials), as well as 700,000 Hungarian forints for an Expert Meeting on a UN Disarmament Database in Budapest.

The World Disarmament Campaign, established in 1982 by a unanimous decision of the General Assembly, has three primary purposes: to inform, to educate and to generate public understanding and support for the objectives of the UN in the field of disarmament. To this end, the Campaign produces a wide range of publications, and organizes meetings to facilitate an exchange of views and information between governmental and non-governmental sectors, and between governmental and other experts.

But, as noted in the report of the Secretary-General on the World Disarmament Campaign for 1990, "the extent to which Campaign activities can be implemented will depend on the availability of funds. Without sufficient voluntary contributions, it will not be possible to maintain the current level of activities, new avenues will have to remain unexplored and the United Nations will be perceived as being unable to respond to the demands of international developments in the field of arms limitation and disarmament."

Member States also took the opportunity at the WDC Pledging Conference to pledge contributions to other disarmament-related activities. These included contributions to the three Regional Centres: $10,000 for Africa, $18,000 for Asia and $15,867 for Latin America; a pledge of $50,000 for the United Nations Disarmament Training Programme in Latin America and the Caribbean; and $170,833, plus 400,000 roubles, for the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR).

Part of the International Ribbons exhibit at the United Nations (see page 16 article)

Argentina and Brazil renounce nuclear weapons

On 28 November Argentina and Brazil formally renounced the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons. At a ceremony held in Foz do Iguacu, Brazil, Presidents Fernando Collor de Mello of Brazil and Carlos Menem of Argentina declared that their nuclear programmes would be employed "solely for peaceful purposes." The two countries pledged to open their records systems and to inform each other as to their present capabilities and inventories. Of special importance was the decision to undertake negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency with the intention of concluding a joint safeguards agreement under IAEA auspices.

While declaring their intentions to apply IAEA safeguards, neither country indicated a shift in policy regarding the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Both States view the Treaty as discriminatory and consider that it impinges on their sovereignty. They have thus chosen not to become parties.

At the same time, the declaration did suggest a shift in each country's policy *vis-à-vis* the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Both countries have signed the Treaty, but Argentina has not ratified it, and Brazil has ratified it but has not waived the requirement that all States in the zone be parties to it before it enters into force. As Brazil and Chile are the only parties that have not waived that requirement, the Treaty is in force for all other parties (23 out of 25). The accord states that after negotiations are concluded with IAEA, Brazil and Argentina will take appropriate action which would allow the Treaty to enter fully into force. They have indicated that this could include updating and improving the Treaty.

General Augustin Quesada Gomez (Spain, Commander of the United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA) watches a UN soldier cutting a weapon surrendered by the Nicaraguan resistance in April 1990 (Photo credit: UN Photo 157598/Steen Johansen)

Peace-keeping and disarmament in Central America

The Central American Security Commission which was set up following the Esquipulas II agreement met from 23-24 November in Tegucigalpa, Honduras to pursue negotiations concerning security, verification, and the control and limitation of armaments in Central America. The Commission is composed of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua.

The Commission agreed in principle on elements for the establishment of a reasonable, proportionate balance of forces in the region, and approved the proposal of its Technical Sub- Commission for a model to monitor the levels and inventories of military installations, equipment and armaments in Central America. It was decided by the five countries that a complete inventory should be ready for the next meeting of the Commission on 26 February.

The Security Commission also agreed to set up a verification mechanism involving the five countries and with the assistance of the United Nations and the Organization of American States. It was also agreed to request the assistance of those two international organizations in creating a mechanism, for instance within the framework of the already existing International Support and Verification Commission to facilitate disarming civilians in the various Central American countries.

Interview with US Ambassador Stephen Ledogar

Q: Ambassador Ledogar, before you went to Geneva to represent the United States in the CD you were associated with the Vienna negotiations on conventional forces in Europe. How do you see the relationship between the conventional forces in Europe talks by the 22 States of the two alliances and the confidence- and security-building negotiations among all 34 States in the CSCE process? To what extent are they coming together?

A: They will come together, although some of us insist that total merger is for the future. Others would like to see a complete merger rather sooner. There is no doubt about the fact that the 22 CFE countries will go back to work as 22 countries between the Paris summit meeting and the Helsinki CSCE Review Conference in 1992. The United States position is, and I think it has been adopted by almost all the others, that a merger of the 22 and the 34 is really not in the cards until after Helsinki. So I would look forward to there being a continuation of two distinct negotiations in Vienna during 1991 and into 1992.

Q: Do you think the progress in arms control and disarmament in Europe has a positive effect elsewhere?

A: I think it does. Almost every speech that we've had in the general debate in the First Committee of the General Assembly has talked about changed circumstances, more propitious arrangements, the breakup of blocs in Europe, and the ending of the cold war. I find personally the most remarkable development is the total change in the attitude of the Soviet Union toward what we regard as the essence of arms control, namely adequate verification. This change is truly revolutionary. In strategic arms control in Geneva there has been very substantial progress although there are still some tough issues. We're still hoping the US and the Soviet Union will be able to conclude a START agreement by the end of the year. The important meetings that took place here in New York in September were very promising.

Q: In Geneva, you are now discussing the draft chemical weapons convention. What verification measures are being discussed there?

A: Verification is very much at the forefront of the issues that remain to be solved. Essentially, after the 1984 initiative of then Vice President Bush, the catch phrase, "anywhere, any time, no right of refusal" attached to verification took hold. At first it was regarded as shockingly intrusive and probably unacceptable. Now it has come around to be a clarion call of most of the major participants. I guess in the history of arms control, verification of chemical weapons must be the most difficult thus far to deal with because a small place could conceal something that would be militarily significant. Thus, by definition, a verification régime in CW must be much more intrusive than, for example in the case of conventional weapons, which in turn is more intrusive than, for example, in strategic or intermediate-range nuclear negotiations. Having said that, there is always push and shove, if you will, for any nation participating in such negotiations, between two national interests. The first one is to achieve the best possible verification to make sure that others are complying with their obligations. On the other hand, all of us have security interests unrelated to chemical weapons that we want to protect, whether they be very sensitive military sites, very sensitive intelligence-gathering facilities, nuclear design facilities, things that have nothing to do with chemical weapons, but where we would not want to have arbitrary intrusion by people who may just be on a treasure hunt. So the problem of how you balance off these two interests is the essence of the dilemma. How do you give meaning to "anywhere, any time, no right of refusal," but still protect your sensitive sites that have nothing to do with chemical weapons.

Q: Are these the factors that are slowing down the negotiations?

A: That's one important issue we are struggling with.

Q: I had the impression that the CW negotiations were yielding more results some time ago than they are doing now.

A: Well, that is what a lot of the old timers say. I've only been there for about nine or ten months. I think the talks were going fast because they were dealing with relatively easy issues; we're down to the toughest issues now: the verification issues, including the so-called challenge inspections; the question of universality, or how do you get all the countries to sign that are necessary to make the convention really meaningful; and the question of what you do about the relationship between the new régime and the 1925 Protocol with regard to retaliatory use of remaining chemical weapons. And then there are a few less difficult questions: sanctions, the composition of the Executive Board, and the question of assistance to countries that are threatened.

Q: What is the idea about sanctions?

A: This addresses what you do if someone falls out of compliance.

Q: Has that been addressed in any way?

A: We're working on that. Positions have been tabled.

Q: What other subjects in the CD do you see as being important for multilateral negotiations?

A: I think the nuclear-testing issues are probably regarded by many as the next most important. Here is a case where we recently re-established an *Ad Hoc* Committee with a non-negotiating mandate to look at the whole area.

Q: Do you think the *Ad Hoc* Committee will be re-established in the next session of the CD?

A: I would think so, unless there is a reformulated mandate that is unacceptable.

Q: At the recent NPT Review Conference there was a great deal of interest in what could be done in the CD to ban the testing of all nuclear weapons. What is your view on this?

A: Our position is that, as long as we rely on nuclear weapons as an instrument of deterrence, it would be irresponsible not to make sure that the weapons on which we depend are reliable. But testing also provides for modernization, and that is a controversial issue. There are those who reason that modernization is bad and that what one wants to do is cease testing and, you could say, make existing weapons anachronistic and obsolescent by making them somewhat unreliable and dangerous. So there are different approaches. Right now, having just ratified the two nuclear-testing treaties on a threshold test ban and on peaceful nuclear explosions, which provide for some very intrusive on-site verification, we'd like to have a little bit of experience with how that works before we make determinations as to what steps might be the ones that would recommend themselves. We are certainly not alone in this.

Q: What is your view of the recent NPT Review Conference?

A: We don't regard that as a failure. We were disappointed that there was no final declaration, but we never believed a final declaration was the only criterion of success or failure. On the contrary, there was a good deal achieved by way of review and re-affirmation of the validity of the régime, and exchange of views on the operation of the Treaty. We don't believe that it is wise to hold the non-proliferation Treaty hostage to the objective of a comprehensive test ban, which is only indirectly related to it; you are endangering one thing, namely the NPT régime itself and IAEA safeguards, for this other objective. It's a power tactic that we think is unwise.

Q: Other parties to the limited test-ban Treaty have said that they wish to be involved in the test-ban issue – they believe it affects them. Do you have any comments?

A: One must ask how, for instance, is Mexico affected today? It is, in my view, hypothetically argued by some that the existence of nuclear weapons is inimical to their national interests. And there are others, and I am one of them, who believe very deeply that the existence of these weapons has prevented major conflict between major Powers, although obviously you can't stop conflicts that start up around the edges. But, in my view, historians in the future are going to look back at the period from 1945 to 1990 as a remarkable achievement where nuclear deterrence played a major role in bringing about the end of the cold war.

Q: In so far as the doctrine of nuclear deterrence was developed in response to the greater conventional weapons capacity of the Warsaw Treaty countries, do you think it is still needed?

A: We said from the very beginning of the conventional talks that to bring the two sides to parity or balance would not rule out the need for nuclear weapons as part of the deterrent. There are many occasions in history where devastating conventional wars have been started either by a side that was conventionally inferior or conventionally superior, or by one side when the two sides were more or less in balance. Nuclear weapons have served to make those choices into non-choices for nuclear-weapon States, so that even after the CFE agreement is signed, and even after the second *tranche* of conventional reductions are negotiated, the need for nuclear weapons will not be ruled out. Now the level and the mix are all negotiable, but I don't see that the elimination of nuclear weapons from Europe would do other than make Europe safe for conventional aggresssion. What is extraordinary about the mixture of conventional and nuclear deterrence is that the aggressor can never calculate what might be the expense, what might be the reaction, and therefore is deterred. We may not like the psychology of that, but most of us believe that it has worked.

Q: What other avenues do you see towards arms control and disarmament?

A: A transitional one is the negotiation of measures that, when applied in connection with limitations, enhance the positive effect of the limitations. Let me give you an example. If you say, in a situation where there is no balance, that both sides are asked to put their ammunition behind their forces, not close to borders, that's probably going to be perceived by the side that thinks it has fewer conventional forces as destabiliz-

ing. If you bring about circumstances where there is essentially a balance between the conventional forces, however, then you can get certain supplies and equipment put into storage – such as tanks or armoured personnel carriers. When you can only take out so many at a time and you have to give notice, that becomes a stabilizing measure that makes the reductions and limitations on tanks all the more important. These are stabilizing measures. Similarly, if you expand on the confidence-building side, they begin to become constraints. You start in with what I call show-and-tell where both parties tell each other what they are going to do and even invite each other to watch their military manoeuvres, so that each party can be assured that nothing the other is doing in the normal course of training is threatening. Once we start agreeing that the parties will restrict what they can do in terms of the character or size of manoeuvres, this goes beyond show-and-tell to constraints, and these begin to look very much like stabilizing measures. There is a continuum. So I think it will be natural at a certain point for the confidence-building measures negotiations and the conventional forces negotiations to merge. But that would be beyond Helsinki '92.

Q: How would you characterize that stage?

A: That would be a stage at which the neutral and non-aligned can participate. They don't want to have anything to do with cuts in their armed forces or armaments, or with putting their territory into the equation. But a neutral country can participate in constraints and stabilizing measures. So I see a merger coming rather naturally.

Q: Do you see anything like that happening in other parts of the world or in other fields, such as the naval environment?

A: Because of various geographical idiosyncracies of our country and our Alliance, and our world-wide responsibilities, we are very cautious when the question of naval arms control is brought up. As regards other regions of the world, I note that there is a long history of countries around the world telling the European-centred super-Powers what they should be doing, and for a long time it was a great game to play them off one against the other. I think that some of these countries are beginning to realize that there is no further pay off or political advantage in that and that they ought to become involved in arms control in their own regions. It isn't going to be easy. It will take an enormous turn around for people to begin to look at their own regions and what could be done there. At the same time, there are factors that favour this. As the cost and sophistication of the weaponry goes up, the enormous costs of modern military machinery comes to compete more and more with the costs of the developmental infrastructure which developing countries need.

Q: Are there any other points you wish to stress?

A: We can already see very important opportunities for a second strategic arms reduction negotiation once we get START I nailed down.

Q: When should START II start?

A: I think very promptly.

Q: And what would be the objective there?

A: Further reductions.

Q: How large will the START I reductions be?

A: It all depends. It is as much as 50 per cent for some systems; it's 30 per cent on certain other measurements like throw weight. There are various percentages, but the whole combination, depending upon how you rate the different measurements, is quite impressive.

Q: It has been said that if you only phase out old, obsolete systems, with continued testing and modernizing, less could be more. Would you care to comment?

A: In the INF agreement, every United States weapon and most of the major Soviet systems including the SS-20s that were destroyed or are being destroyed had been deployed in the previous ten years. But for strategic systems we are obviously not going to phase out the most recent systems and only keep the old ones. And then of course, after CFE, the United States has agreed, in the London NATO ministerial communiqué, to begin development of negotiations on shorter-range nuclear forces (SNF) in Europe. SNF is going to be a very important negotiation.

Q: What is going to be the timing of that?

A: We have said that the United States would be willing to get into this when CFE implementation begins. I think we could get into a preparatory conference relatively soon after CFE. In fact preparations have already started in the NATO Alliance where we have begun to talk about the prospects for this new negotiation in the same body that was used for the inter-Alliance consultations on INF. At any rate, my conclusion is that opportunities in arms control are very rich. In the future we probably will have more negotiations, and I would hope that three or four years from now we will probably have more negotiations than now.

First Committee Chairman, Jai Pratap Rana with Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs Yasushi Akashi to his right and First Committee Secretary Sohrab Kheradi to his left. (UN Photo 176904 J.Isaac)

First Committee increases consensus

With fewer resolutions, and a higher proportion of them adopted by consensus, the statements and votes in the Committee reflected the ending of the cold war. Efforts to reduce confrontation in the formulation of some resolutions made it possible for the Committee to adopt half of its resolutions (26 out of 52) by consensus. New and more complex voting patterns, especially by East-Central European States, were also seen to reflect new realities and perhaps a new realism.

At the end of the voting on disarmament resolutions in the Committee, its Chairman, Ambassador Jai Pratap Rana of Nepal, drew attention to "the shared hope that the changing international climate would facilitate the process of arms limitation and disarmament." He expressed his own hope that the trends witnessed in " the narrowing of our differences, the broadening of our areas of concern, and the striving towards practical steps in the field of disarmament — will continue, and be strengthened."

Quotes from the General Assembly

"Despite [the NPT Review Conference's] regrettable inability to adopt a final declaration, we none the less consider it to have been a considerable success, reaching agreement, as it did, on a number of important issues, in particular the question of full-scope safeguards as a condition for nuclear supply. We will be working to build on the achievements of the Conference..."

- Gareth Evans, Australia

"Guns will proliferate if the need for them exists. Therefore disarmament cannot truly succeed unless we resolutely alter the current global milieu."

- Hussain Muhammed Ershad, Bangladesh

"Brazil today discards the idea of any experiments that might involve nuclear explosions, even if only for peaceful purposes."

- Fernando Collor, Brazil

"It is Canada's firm view that both the non-proliferation Treaty and a comprehensive test-ban Treaty are too important for international peace and security to be held hostage to one another."

- Joe Clark, Canada

"The Chinese Government holds that in order to prevent a nuclear war and promote nuclear disarmament, all nuclear States should undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances and unconditionally not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-free zones."

- Qian Qichen, China

"[The conventional arms race and the illegal arms traffic]... are other threats to peace and stability, particularly for the developing countries....[W]e have personal experience of the carnage it causes."

- Cesar Gaviria, Colombia"

We intend to become a party to the convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons as soon as it is finalized. We have published detailed information on our peacetime chemical potential. We have tested the feasibility of challenge inspections at chemical plants, as well as in military facilities. We have withdrawn our earlier reservation to the 1925 Geneva Protocol on the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons in war."

- Juri Dienstbier, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic



"We are at the crossroads of two centuries, and we can express our dreams in three words: disarmament, arbitration and collective security. There has been disorder, dictatorship and war all at the same time. Let us see to it that through the United Nations, right, solidarity and peace finally govern in these new times."

- François Mitterand, France"

The ending of the East-West confrontation and the development of a new relationship between the member States of the two alliances open the way for a new system of co-operation in Europe...The changing North Atlantic defence alliance and the European Community, to which the united Germany too will belong, as well as the CSCE will be pillars of this new system.... in which military security will be complemented by a broader and more solid foundation for co-operation aimed at safeguarding peace."

- Hans-Dietrich Genscher, Federal Republic of Germany

"The Republic of Hungary considers that its security can best be strengthened by the establishment of...a cooperative security system which will embrace all CSCE States and will be in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter".

- Géza Jeszenszky, Hungary

"With the end of the cold war we feel that now is the time – and a most opportune one – for the international community to question the validity of theories that seek to justify continuation of nuclear weapons".

- Shri Inder Kumar Gujral, India



"[It is an] untenable position that the complete cessation of nuclear testing can only be negotiated bilaterally between the two super-Powers".

- Ali Alatas, Indonesia

"It [is] imperative that there be greater disclosure and greater transparency in the transfer of conventional weapons...."

- Taro Nakayama, Japan

"In our view a comprehensive test ban is the only viable way to stop the technological momentum of the nuclear arms race..... Kenya does not share the view that [the question of verification] is an obstacle to the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty".

- Wilson Ndolo Ayah, Kenya

"We shall continue to resist the idea of our region being used as a testing ground for nuclear weapons or for the dumping or disposal of nuclear or toxic waste".

- Fran Wilde, New Zealand

-[The CSCE] must be transformed from a political process to an institutional framework. The new era in East-West relations has created historic opportunities for disarmament and arms control.... The historic changes in Europe tell us to be ambitious also in attacking the global issues, such as the elimination of chemical weapons and the prevention of nuclear proliferation".

- Jan P. Syse, Norway

"There is now an urgent need for all countries to put in place effective standards for the disposal of toxic wastes within their own borders. Rigourous standards should also be observed for the trans-boundary movement of toxic wastes".

- Augustus Aikhomu, Nigeria

"It is essential to consider measures for disarmament at the regional level in order to strengthen peace and security".

- Sahabzada Yaqub-Khan, Pakistan

"Let us face it: cracks have appeared in the nuclear non-proliferation régime...As a matter of the utmost urgency, nuclear tests have to be stopped....If testing is stopped, we have a chance to survive; otherwise the world will perish. I have no doubt whatever about this."

- Eduard Shevardnadze, USSR

"For the first time, [with the signing of the CFE Treaty] the main instruments of physical force will be subject to detailed international law. Arms control and arms reduction, which have been a distant aspiration...are becoming a reality in Europe...."

- Douglas Hurd, United Kingdom

"In June, the United States and the Soviet Union signed a landmark agreement to halt production [of chemical weapons], and destroy the vast majority of our stockpiles....But time is running out. This is not merely a bilateral concern. The Gulf crisis proves how important it is to act together – and to act now – to conclude an absolute, world-wide ban on these weapons".

- George Bush, United States

"Dividing walls may be torn down; ideological confrontations may be mitigated; borders may be opened to communication and trade, the wing of democracy may fly over and destroy anachronistic authoritarian schemes, but no stable security or lasting peace will be attained as long as gigantic arsenals exist all over the world, ready to be used by any arbitrary and aggressive government."

- Hector Gros Espiell, Uruguay

"We are encouraged by the progress made in the search among countries of the East and West for an open skies agreement....For ...confidence to be general and shared by all States, however, it is preferable that capabilities for taking advantage of the resulting transparency are commonly shared."

- Robert Mugabe, Zimbabwe

NGO news items

The brief report below on activities of non-governmental organizations includes some of the events and programmes which have come to the attention of the United Nations Department for Disarmament Affairs. The coverage does not imply any judgement by the United Nations.

The International Studies Association is to be the host for a conference entitled "New Dimensions in International Relations" to be held in Vancouver, Canada from 19-23 March 1991. **Contact:** Brian L. Job, Institute of International Relations, University of British Columbia, C456-1866 Main Mall, Vancouver, V6T1W5 Canada (Tel: 604 228 5540, or Hideo Sato, College of International Relations, The University of Tsukuba, Tsukuba City, Ibaraki 305, Japan (Fax: 81 298 53 5070)

Approximately 1,000 delegates and journalists attended the **Helsinki Citizens Assembly** which took place in Prague in October 1990. Based on the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 and the subsequent documents of the 34 countries in the CSCE process, the Assembly was seen as the Helsinki process from below. It had five major themes: demilitarization and peace politics, economy and ecology, nationalism and con-federal structures, human rights including minority rights and civil society, and the institutional process of European integration. An International Co-ordinating Committee will further develop the Assembly process. **Contact:** Assembly Secretariat 116 69 Praha 1, Panská 7, Czech and Slovak Federal Republic (Tel: 42-2-220181 or 220948 or 223051, ext. 383 or 384. Telex: 122 384 csmv c)

The **International Ribbons** exhibit was on display from 7 January 1991 for one month in the public exhibition area of the United Nations General Assembly building in New York. The Ribbons are sturdy cloth panels with embroidery, quilting and painting designed to illustrate what the artist making the panel would not be able to "bear to think of as lost forever in a nuclear war". The first Ribbon events were held in the United States and Japan leading to a major exhibit on 4 August 1985 when tens of thousands of the ribbon panels were tied together in Washington, D.C., and other ribbons simultaneously in Hiroshima to commemorate the fortieth anniversary of the nuclear bombing at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. As an ongoing project linking people in countries around the world, the Ribbon exhibits have been displayed widely to demonstrate the diversity of cultural perspectives from which people reach a universal desire for peace, joy and hope. **Contact:** Michele M. Peppers, 7 Diana Hill, Huntington, N.Y. 11743, USA (Tel: 516 673-5854 or 212 689-0048)

The **Quaker Council for European Affairs** together with Woodbrooke College have organized a Conference on Europe: Nationalism and Security to be held from 12-14 April at Woodbrooke College, Birmingham, England. Special reference will be given to the problems of nationalism in Europe. **Contact:** Stuart Morton, Woodbrooke College, 1046 Bristol Road, Selly Oak, Birmingham B29 6LJ, England.

The **Anuvrat Global Organization** is holding an International Conference on Peace and Nonviolent Action in Rajsamand - Udaipur (Rajasthan), India from 17 to 21 February 1991. Supported by the International Peace Bureau, the International Peace Research Association and a number of other organizations, the Conference organizers are selecting 100 overseas participants and 50 from India who are offered free local hospitality conforming to Gandhian simplicity. Participants who wish to present papers at various dialogue/discussion groups will address a range of topics relating to the Conference theme. The UN University for Peace in Costa Rica's project on Seeking the True Meaning for Peace is also being considered. **Contact:** S.L.Gandhi, Co-ordinator, A-12, Anita Colony, Bajaj Nagar, Jaipur-302015 India (Tel: 141-510118 or 510347, Fax: 141-40909-62018)

Project Ploughshares has produced a Study Kit on Common Security. It is designed to provide a framework for describing peace, disarmament and justice issues to show their interdependence and to allow groups supporting these issues to explain what they stand for, not just what they are against. Topics discussed include, defending without threatening dismantling alliances, strengthening international order, controlling military production and making deep cuts meaningful. The kit contains an inflatable globe and 14 transpanencies that can be used for slide-show presentations. **Contact**: Project Ploughshares, Conrad Grebel College, Waterloo, Ontario N2L 3G6, Canada (Tel: 519 888 6541, Fax: 519 885 0014)